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Between Democracy and Gleichschaltung * 
Von Ronald M. S mel s er 
We are accustomed to speaking of German National Socialism and Adolf Hitler 
in the same breath, as if to accept the proposition that the two were synonymous. 
Given the fact that Hitler exercised absolute domination over the movement during 
most of the period and that he was for many National Socialists the embodiment, 
the myth-person of the movement, there is much truth in this *. National Socialism 
as it came to prominence and power in Germany is unthinkable without Hitler. 
But this was not always the case. As a set of ideas and attitudes, as a political 
Organization, National Socialism pre-dates Hitler; and even after his entry into 
politics in 1919, there were a number of National Socialists who still regarded 
themselves as the center of the movement by virtue of their seniority, of their 
political experience and success, and of their ideological development2. These 
were the pioneers and their conception of National Socialism in the early years 
was far different than that of Hitler. They were the National Socialists of Bohemia 
(Czechoslovakia). 
Eventually, certainly by 1923, these older Nazis would succumb to the personal 
appeal and dazzling regional success of Hitler and his branch of the movement and 
accept his leadership. But, even then, as they paid homage to Hitler as the Führer, 
they attached a very different meaning to the word than did the Nazis in Germany. 
For operating as they were in another country, both beyond the interest and direct 
influence of Hitler, they were able to hold on to much of their autonomy and 
independence in practice, and could cherish the not completely unjustified belief 
that they were still the senior Nazis, the conscience of the party, and the not always 
appreciated heralded outpost of the movement out on the borders of Germandom. 
Their course was, from the beginning, different from that of the Munich branch of 
the movement; their relationship with Hitler himself much more ambiguous than 
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that of the Reich Nazis; indeed, it was, at least until 1923, and to an extent even 
for years thereafter quite a symbiotic relationship. 
This symbiosis is significant for two reasons, which have bearing on understand-
ing the rise of Hitler. First, it unterscores the importance of context. Certainly 
we recognize the unique importance of Hitler's personality and will. Perhaps so 
much so that we over-emphasize that factor and forget too easily that Hitler's 
unique talents were so effective precisely because they meshed with an environ-
ment in the early years uniquely suited to enhance them: post-war Bavaria, and 
in particular, Munich. Had that context been different — or had Hitler been else-
where — National Socialism would have been a far different movement. The for-
gotten Nazis of Bohemia were one example of National Socialism out of such a 
salubrious context — just as in a far different way the National Socialism of Fried-
rich Naumann before the war was a far different phenomenon because of the con-
text. All three, despite the differences, have in common an attempt to merge what 
Friedrich Meinecke called the „two great waves" of the nineteenth Century — 
Nationalism and Socialism. That they are so different is largely a matter of con-
text. 
Secondly, the relationship of the Bohemian Nazis to Hitler is significant for 
what it contributed to him and his movement. Though he never acknowledged it 
subsequently, he owed them a great deal. Though he largely rejected their brand of 
National Socialism, their political style and conception of leadership, he found it 
necessary, especially after his abortive putsch in 1923, to return to the wellsprings 
of their National Socialism for sustenance. That he borrowed was a tacit, though 
never admitted, recognition that the Sudeten Nazis were the senior Nazis, the 
pioneers. 
A few years earlier this seniority would have been perfectly apparent, and it is 
interesting to contrast the Bohemian Nazis with Hitler in 1919. On October 16, 
1919, Hitler took the tiny DAP to the public for the first time with a rally schedu-
led at the Hofbräuhaus in Munich. He and other leaders of the party were worried 
that if only a handful of people showed up, the party would go broke. They need 
not have worried, for the party managed to collect enough that night to justify 
having rented the hall. In his maiden speech, Hitler addressed all of 111 people 
and discovered, by his own testimony: „I can speak 3!" 
At that same time leaders of the Bohemian Nazi Party, the DNSAP, were plann-
ing their party day to be held on November 15 in the city of Dux, Czechoslovakia4. 
They offered quite a contrast to their, as yet, obscure counterpart in Munich. As 
the 119 assembled delegates at the congress would hear, their party was doing 
quite well. Representatives were there from no less than 327 locals. Moreover, in 
the local elections which had been held in June, their party had garnered 50,000 
votes and elected 618 people to local offices, including many mayors. The icing on 
the cake was the fact that they were celebrating the 16th anniversary of the found-
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ing of the party, which had not only survived the fall of the Habsburg Empire, but 
also a splintering that left a section of the original party trapped in the new, rump 
Austrian statě, and the other in the newly created Czechoslovakian statě. Despite 
these blows, the future seemed bright. The party had a solid social base amongst 
the craftsmen and skilled laborers of northern Bohemia and even a „Bible" of 
sorts: one of the party leaders, Rudolf Jung, had just published a book entitled 
Der nationale Sozialismus in which he laid out the world view of the movement 5. 
Perhaps most importantly, these representatives took some pride in representing 
what they claimed to be a great Weltanschauung which would heal the split in 
German society and go on to realize the goal of a „free, socialist, Greater Ger­
many". Indeed,they took pride in being the first free party in Austria to call for 
Anschluss and eagerly sought to recruit like-minded people in Germany. If any of 
them had been asked to identify the name — Adolf Hitler — at this point, the 
response would surely have been a blank look of bewilderment. 
The Bohemian National Socialists were, however, looking across the border into 
the Reich; and what they were discovering there only gave further credence to 
their claim to be pioneers of National Socialism. For in various parts of Germany, 
groups and parties emerged advocating quite similar ideas. As far away as Königs­
berg in East Prussia, someone had read Jung's book and formed a local Organi­
zation 8. In Düsseldorf, an engineer named Alfred Brunner founded a political 
party which he called the Deutschsoziale Partei based upon the same ideas as the 
Bohemian party; soon DSP claimed locals scattered all over Germany. The one in 
Nuremberg was headed by one Julius Streicher 7. 
In Munich, Anton Drexler, a machinist employed by the railroad, formed a poli­
tical Organization which he called, after the pre-war-Austrian party, the Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei; his pamphlet, My Political Awakening, revealed again a close 
similarity in ideas to those of the Bohemian party. In this case, the affinity is not 
surprising. Both the new Munich group and the much older Bohemian party had a 
core of strength among the railwaymen — and given the old pre-war extraterri-
toriality of the railway between Germany and Austria, in particular as it passed 
through the rabidly nationalistic town of Eger, the Munich and Bohemian railway­
men probably had had a great deal of contact with each other for quite some years 8. 
Interestingly enough, though, as the Bohemians looked across the border, they gave 
only passing, though pleased, notice to the founding of a like-minded Organization 
in Munich. Munich, after all, was only one province. It was rather the DSP, which 
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already had a national network, to which the DNSAP looked to as the real founda­
tion of National Socialism in the Reich 9. 
At this point, in dramatic contrast to the later Hitlerian period, National Socia­
lism was to be an astounding degree, open, free, almost ecumenical in nature. Any 
group, party, or Organization in Germany which espoused even vaguely similar 
ideas, under whatever name, was regarded as a kindred spirit, and as a fellow 
National Socialist. New groups, whatever the form their Organization might take 
were welcomed into the fold almost with no questions asked, if they spoke the 
right ideological language 1 0. Although firmly anchored in organizational form in 
Austria and Bohemia, National Socialism seemed in the minds of its adherents to 
be far more important as revolutionary ideal than as political form. 
The content of the ideal was similar for all groups. All were unreservedly pan-
German and envisioned a great German statě which would dominate Mitteleuropa. 
All were anti-semitic, in that they saw the Jew as the main culprit in Germany's 
misfortune. Their language however was not yet as brutal as it would become; they 
contented themselves here in the early days with decrying the depredations of the 
„Jewish spirit" and spoke not yet of „Juda verrecke" " . Moreover, most of 
them were still caught up in the spirit of democratization and were generally run 
on a democratic basis; the generál disillusionment with democracy as a form of 
government had not yet set in 1 2. All were concerned centrally with the condition 
of the worker and with fitting him into the community of the nation. Above all, 
they were concerned with creating a Greater Germany, which would enable the 
borderland Germans to become part of a powerful German statě. Their Stance in 
advocating these things was a radical one, but their radicalism was more form 
than substance. Two things would keep it that way and make them so much diffe­
rent from the Hitlerian Nazis which would soon become prominent, first in Munich, 
then in Bavaria. One was a continuity from the pre-war period which had deve-
loped certain political behavior patterns which kept them from becomming too 
9
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overtly radical. The leaders of the party had matured politically in the context 
of the old Reichsrat, which although it had witnessed much violence within its 
walls, had nevertheless functioned as a parliamentary forum. Having to contend for 
decades verbally with their opponents made the DNSAP leaders much more in-
clined toward verbal sparring than toward Street combat. Moreover, this political 
continuity also helped to mitigate the legacy of the war: a life of violence which in 
Germany moved easily from the trenches to the streets. 
Secondly, the Bohemian National Socialists were functioning in a completely 
different immediate post-war context than were their confreres in the Reich. 
Munich had, after all, undergone serious social upheaval in the wake of war's end, 
with bloody internecine warfare and three socialist regimes within less than a 
year 13. Bohemia by contrast had very quickly and rdatively peacefully been occu-
pied by Czech military with a dazed, shocked German population acquiescing 
reluctantly in the creation of a new statě. The only revolution in Bohemia was the 
peaceful national revolution of the Czechs1 4. Thus, while a Freikorps-dominated 
Ornungszelle Bayern was drawing all the desultory radical right-wing groups in 
German society like a magnet, thereby creating the ideal climate for the emergence 
of a violent, putsch-oriented, and non-ideological National Socialist movement, 
the opposite Situation obtained in Bohemia. The relatively peaceful transition from 
Hapsburg to Czech rule, the absence of social upheaval, the mere fact that the 
Germans found themselves a minority in someone eise's country, only strengthened 
the force of continuity and prevented the Bohemian Nazis from moving in a radi­
cal, violent direction. If Hitler's NSDAP was the „spoiled darling" of the Bava-
rian Government, the DNSAP was the dosely watched, potentially treasonable 
faction in Czechoslovakian politics. The Sudeten Nazis thus found themselves 
east into a „legalistic" framework already in 1918 that Hitler would not have to 
contend with until after his abortive putsch five years later. 
One of the most dramatic contrasts arising from the differences in content bet­
ween the two branches of the movement lay in the nature of the leadership of the 
two groups after Hitler had become an important figuře in Munich. The Munich 
leaders were a much more heterogeneous group: they ranged from a strong ex-soldier 
component, veterans, Freikorps activists of the Roehm and von Salomon type; to 
the declassé, men of some social Standing whose position in society had been under-
mined by the war, the Göring and Himmler sort; to the emigrés, those like Rosen-
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berg and Scheubner-Richter, who brought with them the violent ideological resent-
ments engendered by their fear of the Russian revolution and all it had unleashed 15. 
What made this diverse collection of rootless and violent men even more radical 
was the fact that unlike the Bohemian leaders, they had no political experience 
behind them, and thus no preconceived ideas about political behavior. Accordingly, 
they could put within the framework of politics the fears, resentments and frusta-
tions that marked post-war German society without the constraints of previously 
developed behavior patterns. The fact that in addition the Munich Nazis were 
overwhelmingly young only exacerbated the tendency toward radicalism16. 
The Bohemian leaders, already active for years in politics, were, as a group, 
strikingly different. They tended to fall into two groups, reflecting the Austrian 
background of the movement: The „intellectuals" and the labor leaders ". This 
breakdown, to be sure, caused many an ideological quarrel in the party. The labor 
agitators like Hugo Simm, Rudolf Kasper and Adam Fahrner who defined the 
DNSAP rather strictly as a class party often found themselves at odds with the 
„intellectuals" like Jung himself, who tried to broaden the definition of worker 
to include just about everybody. But this ideological push-pull aside, these men 
are nothing like the declassé condottiere who flourished iri Munich. The Bohe-
mians had roots, were older, possessed a reliable clientele, and were mired down 
in older behavior patterns which, along with the environment in which they were 
operating, prevented any radicalism from surfacing that even vaguely resembled 
that in Munich. 
Many differences emerge in the approach of the two respective groups to poli-
tics as well. For one thing, the DNSAP was profoundly ideological during these 
early years, while the Munich branch of the movement was in its day to day activi-
ties virtually bereft of any ideological foundation beyond an arsonal of evocative 
slogans. The DNSAP had been concerned from the beginning about the content of 
National Socialism. The first reaction on the part of the leadership in assessing 
the election results of the Austrian Nationalrat in 1919 and its poor performance 
(this was the last election in which the Austrian and Bohemian National Socialists 
would candidate as one party) was to conclude that they needed to increase the 
size of the party press, undertake serious organizational work, but above all, to 
develop a sound theoretical foundation for the movement18. Moreover, in the 
frequent party caucuses and congresses, most of the time was spent in endless theo-
retical debates over doctrine. Are we a class party or not? How should we define 
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our socialism? How far should we go in demanding nationalization of industry? 
Questions like this dominated the agenda of party gatherings and were taken 
quite seriously 1 9. It was partly as a result of this debatě that Jung attempted his 
theoretical work (Der nationale Sozialismus) which he intended to play a role in 
National Socialism similar to that of Das Kapital in Marxism. His book feil far 
short of the scope and insight of Marx, relecting the relative intellectual merits of 
the two men, but that he attempted it at all bears witness to the basically ideologi­
cal thrust of this variety of National Socialism, and unlike Hitler's later book, 
Mein Kampf, Jung's is a serious attempt to elaboráte ideology rather than an 
extended autobiography written in aggressive rhetorical style 2 0. This strong 
emphasis on ideology and doctrine stems in large part from how these National 
Socialists defined their movement in the years just after the war. To them, trapped 
in a statě not of their own making, anxious for any sign of like-minded people 
across the border in the Reich, and really quite helpless to do anything practical to 
realize their dream of a Greater Germany, National Socialism was primarily an 
„idea" which existed apart from any single group or Organization which might 
try to embody it. 
The Bohemian Nazis also differed considerably from the Munich ones in how 
they disseminated their ideas. Partly as a result of their somewhat more contempla-
tive, ideological Stance, the DNSAP still ušed, to a great degree, the dicussion 
group as its main political formát and, at the same time, relied very heavily on the 
printed word. 
A glance at the week's activities column in the main party páper gives one a 
good idea of the level on which they were working: discussion evenings in taverns 
predominate, dosely followed by concerts, turner demonstrations and lectures 2 1. 
It ist precisely that Verein-ism which Hitler found to be so contemptible in the DAP 
before he took it over, and indeed resembles greatly the backroom meetings of the 
pre-Hitlerian Munich party. There is nothing here of the wild, brawling political 
happenings which characterized the typical Nazi rally in Munich. 
The DNSAP, by 1922, could boast a considerable press, including eleven news-
papers, mostly on the country and district level2 2. Their total circulation varied 
between 3,000 and 6,000. The party relied heavily on this means of communi-
cation to get across its ideas. Indeed, it was part of the party Constitution that eadi 
Typical is the lengthy discussion of the concepts „nationalization" and „socialization" 
in Tag, no. 191, November 20, 1919. 
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pg had to subscribe to one of them. But again, the papers scarcely have the tone of 
a Kampfbewegung. In an attempt to disseminate the National Socialist idea as 
broadly as possible, the papers included everything from feuilleton to community 
affairs announcements to pot boiling novels in seriál form. The whole tenor was 
by and large quite spießbürgerlich and oppressively provincial for a movement 
that was demanding a „free, social Greater Germany". Even the leadership 
recognized this; at the second party day in Troppau in September 1920, there was 
much criticism of the main party organ, Der Tag, and the Suggestion was made 
that it be transferred to a larger city than Dux in order to overcome its provin-
ciality 2 3. 
The Munich Nazis, to be sure, had their VB, but it was mainly a backup for 
Hitler's main tool in gaining followers: the mass rally and the spoken word. The 
story of Hitler's masterful use of that uniquely Munich political institution of the 
beer hall is too familiär to need relating here. But one should underscore the point 
that unlike the Sudeten Nazis with their relatively peaceful meetings and endless 
ideological bantering in the press, the Munich NS were far more interested in 
arousing the mass emotions through appeal by shouted slogan and manipulated 
terror than in discussing any ideas with anyone 2 4. 
Once more, the differing contexts are important; the relatively stable, quite 
provincial environment of Bohemia where a newly created Czechoslovak govern­
ment watched dosely for any manifestations of German radicalism contrasts strik-
ingly with revolution-torn Munich with its circus atmosphere and a climate salub-
rious to emotional appeal and rightwing violence. The DNSAP simply did not 
have the two vital ingredients that characterized Hitler's movement in Munich; 
theatrics and terror. 
It was not only in their method of proseletizing, but also in other kinds of politi­
cal activity that the two branches of National Socialism differed. The DNSAP, 
trapped within a systém which did not permit paramilitary activity, was forced 
to keep to its pre-war tradition of fighting its battles verbally within the frame­
work of a representative government. Unlike the NSDAP in Munich, it was unable 
to develop the military wing, the equivalent of the SA, which drive Hitler's move­
ment so inexorably toward putschism 2 5. Moreover, given the growing post-war 
role of the statě as dispenser of patronage, the party also spent a great deal of its 
2 3
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time lobbying for its constituents 2 6. These limitations on its activity determined 
that its political Stance would be basically one of patient waiting, its approach 
evolutionary, relying on the eventuality that circumstances would become more 
propitious for the realization of its goals. It found itself, then, almost against its 
will, being integrated into the ongoing political systém. 
The NDSAP in Munich on the other hand, finding itself within a statě virtually 
universally reviled and in an atmosphere conducive to violent activity, could con-
vince itself that political activity involving immediate, violent confrontation with 
the statě might bring it success 2 7. Its approach to politics consequently was im-
patient and revolutionary. This contrast, in turn, helps to explain the difference 
between the two groups with respect to ideology: the NSDAP with nowhere to go 
and nothing to lose and everything to gain, whose worst enemy was time, and 
least conspicuous quality patience, had no need for an ideological foundation to 
carry it through the wilderness. 
The radically different contexts in which they functioned helps to explain one 
other basic difference between the two Segments of National Socialism. One can 
argue endlessly about the class base of the NSDAP; its bunte Mischung gives evi­
dence for many interpretations2 8. The social base of the DNSAP was much less 
ambiguous. The DNSAP was very much wedded to a class base, and although it 
sought to recruit Germans of all backgrounds in Bohemia, the core of its support 
remained what it had been before the war — the workers and handicraftsmen of 
northern Bohemia. Reflecting this base, the DNSAP took very seriously its task 
of winning the worker over to nationalism and to attacking the excesses of cápi-
talist society. Its close associations with nationalist unions underscored this orien-
tation. By contrast, the indecisiveness shown by Hitler on the occasions of the 
Munich railway strike of May, 1922, betrayed the fact that the NSDAP had no 
clear position on the problems of labor 2 9. 
The decision-making process in the two groups was also radically different. The 
DNSAP, although it came to reject western-style parliamentarism, and, in bitter-
ness after the war, often the idea of democracy itself, still, in its day-to-day prac-
tice, functioned in a relatively democratic way. All party leaders were elected 
democratically and the annual party congress, to which delegates were also elected, 
was regarded as the ultimate decision-making body, the source of authority in the 
party. Moreover, those who guided the destinies of the party from day to day 
always functioned as a collective leadership. N o one of them dominated in any-
See S m e 1 s e r : Nazis without Hitler 14. 
A number of observers have noted that by 1923, the NSDAP had given up any inten-
tions of being a parliamentary party and had devoted itself entirely to putschism. See 
K e l e : Nazis and Workers. Chapel Hill / North Carolina 1972, p. 64. — H a l e , 
Oron J . : Gottfried Feder calls Hitler to Order: An unpublished Letter on Nazi Party 
Affairs. Journal of Modern History 30 (1958) 359—362. 
Gordon argues convincingly that debatě over the class composition of the Nazi party 
and its supporters misses the point; that its success lay in the fact that it was a party 
against class and class division. Beer Hall Putsch 71—86. — F e s t , Joachim: Hitler. 
New York 1974, pp. 154—155. 
M a s e r : Frühgeschichte 337—340. 
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thing like the fashion that Hitler did in Munich. Nor had anyone of them the will, 
personality or intent to become what Hitler did in Munich by at least mid-1921 — 
the embodiment of the movement, its myth person. As one DNSAP leader, Alexan-
der Schilling, noted on the occasion of Jung's election to the Prague Parliament: 
„It is not the business of our party to develop a cult of personality. The idea of 
National Socialism is anchored in hearts and brains, is carried by the spirit of the 
times and not in a pair of eyes, hands and legs. Far be it from us to see this elec-
toral victory as a personal success on the part of the candidate . . . 3 0 . " It is per-
haps because they did not aspire as Hitler did, that they failed to see where he was 
going or to realize the true nature of his demands. Konrad Heiden, an early obser-
ver of both groups, noted with some contempt that Jung had not caught on to the 
new Führer-principle yet. He quotes Jung as urging pgs in Berlin, Leipzig and else-
where to stand by Hitler in building up the movement throughout Germany. 
To subordinate themselves to Hitler would have been far more accurate from 
Hitler's point of view, Heiden suggests. To be sure, Heiden observes shrewdly, 
the Sudetens accept Hitler as the leader of the movement, but „in the urbane 
form of the modern club" and not in the complete fanatical Subordination which 
Hitler envisions31. This difference in approach to decision making — and above 
all, the degree to which the Bohemian Nazis misunderstood their position vis-a-vis 
Hitler would create problems between the two. 
One more related difference, finally, distinguished the two parties: that of self-
image. The DNSAP leaders were always quite ecumenical. Although they certainly 
saw themselves as pioneers of National Socialism, they at no time regarded themselves 
as its exclusive representatives. On the contrary, they welcomed all those of even 
remote like-mindedness into the fold. They saw the DNSAP as only the spearhead 
of a National Socialist idea which other groups could accept and still keep their 
own organizational integrity. The DNSAP sought allies and were not terribly 
discriminating about where they found them. At times, it seemed that any group 
which spoke in völkisch terminology was acceptable. Nor did the DNSAP people 
try to impose their will on the other groups; usually they thought in terms of a 
loose alliance, and fully recognized that different areas had different problems 
which could only be solved by those immediately involved 32. And even when 
they thought in terms of creating a unified Organization, it was meant to be one of 
co-equals, not one to be dominated by one faction, much less by one man. Again, 
as Heiden noted, Jung was always giving the Munich party advice as to which 
groups they might ally with. These included everyone from the Pan-German 
League to the German Nationalist Association of Retail Clerks. „This Suggestion 
of Jung's for a cartell", Heiden noted, „came from a hopelessly parliamentary 
30
 Tag, no. 90, April 22, 1920. 
31
 H e i d e n , Konrad: Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus. Die Karriere einer Idee. Ber-
lin 1932, pp. 101—103. 
32
 DNSAP leader, Alexander Schilling, for example, envisioned an alliance among such 
diverse groups as land reformers („Freiland und Freiwirtschaft"); currency reformers 
(„Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft"); völkisch religious reformers and anti-semites. See 
article in Tag, no. 156, July 27, 1920. 
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brain and smellcd much too much like deputies club and slates of candidates. Hitler 
was furious33." Undaunted, Jung tried to bring about an amalgamation of the 
DSP, which had its strength in northern Germany, and the NSDAP in Munich. 
The terms he envisioned are interesting in that they indeed reflect his naivete about 
the nature of Hitler's party. Part of the unifying agreement was to be that the 
DSP group, responsible for organizing north Germany, would determine the presid-
ing officer; the NSDAP, which was assigned southern Germany, would determine 
the vice-presiding officer, the reason being that the DSP had 60 Ortsgruppen, 
while the NSDAP had only 20. As he left the Conference at which the terms were 
proposed, Jung considered the unification as „beschlosssene Sache" contingent 
upon formal agreement by the Munich people 34. How little did he know Hitler 
at this point! One DSP sympathizer residing in Munich had a much clearer picture 
of the „new" National Socialist politics. Addressing himself to the question of 
who should absorb whom, he wrote to a colleague in the north: „The development 
of the Hitlerian N.D.A.O. [sic] has shown that it alone in the national socialist 
movement has a right to exist. Show me a locality which in the course of one year 
has staged 45 mass meetings. The Munich group did precisely that in 1921. The 
Munich group now counts over 2500 members and about 45000 sympathizers. Does 
any one of you have even remotely that many 35?" 
And even as Jung was returning to Czechoslovakia, congratulating himself on 
his mediation, the leader of the DSP was seeing the handwriting on the wall: 
„All the factors", Alfred Brunner wrote, „which I cannot reiterate here lead me 
to the conclusion that we must join the National Socialists at our next party day . . . 
We must see the light and make an end of it. It is a fact, that most of our DSP 
Ortsgruppen haven't managed to get beyond a Vereinsmeierei. We lack powerful 
Speakers and a powerful personality with total commitment. We are all too tied 
down. My own business activities také up nearly all my time. I am constantly on 
the r o a d . . . " 
But his vision was only partly accurate. He adds that „therefore we shall have 
to make the best of it with Hitler. I mean we don't have to fear him and I hope 
that the DSP people will be strong enough in the Organization [Verein!] to put 
some limits on the Hitler people. As the movement gets larger, others will emerge 
as a counterweight to a party papacy developing36." 
Four months later in July, 1921, Hitler established his total and dictatorial con-
trol over the party 37. Both Hitler's putsch in the party as well as his idea of what 
the relationship between the NSDAP and other groups should be dramatically illu-
33
 H e i d e n : Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 101. 
34
 See Jung's remarks in the official report of the Third Conference of the DSP, March 
26—28, 1921 in Zeitz. NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 4, Folder 109; also Tag, no. 51, 
April 1, 1921. 
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strate how the self-image of the Munich group differed from that of the Bohemian 
Nazis. For Hitler, the party was an elitě vanguard of fighters who wanted not 
allies, but total Submission to Hitler and submersion into the NSDAP. As Hitler 
put it graphically, in direct Opposition to Jung (and incidentally to Drexler as well, 
who supported Brunner's plan for a united party): „Its the greatest mistake to 
believe that a movement becomes stronger through uniting with other similarly 
constituted groups. Any growth which proceeds in this manner means initially, to 
be sure, an outward increase in numbers and in the eyes of a superficial observer, 
also an increase in power. As a matter of fact, however, the movement is only 
sowing the seeds of a later internal weakness3 8." 
All these differences generated quite a bit of antagonism between the Bohemian 
(and Austrian) branches of the movement in the early years, as both direct and in-
direct evidence attests. 
A dissertation written in 1931 from a pronouncedly Nazi point of view notes 
that, during the summer of 1921 and after, the Sudeten-Austrian group stood in 
quite a hostile relationship with Munich. Any sense of brotherhood, the author 
notes, had been „illusory" and continued to be so. „In the course of early 1922", 
he continued, „there were in part quite pronounced differences between Troppau-
Vienna and Munich" to the point where Hitler considered setting up his own locals 
in Austria. Of course, he could not have done so in Czechoslovakia 3 9. 
The Bohemian Nazi press also betrayed the rancor which often developed as the 
Sudetens took issue with both Hitler's methods and his claims to dominance. On 
pondering the tasks of the liaison off ice linking the Nazi groups in Germany, Austria 
and Czechoslovakia, the so-called „Interstate Chancellery" (zwischenstaatliche 
Kanzlei) in July 1921, Schilling, a prominent DNSAP leader, likened the move­
ment to different marching columns which should be able to march separately as 
well as together. „The center", he continued, „must be aware of the needs of the 
flanks. The center [Munich] must not only be aware of its own needs, but allow 
the flanks (Sudeten and Austrian) to be themselves 4 0 ." 
Perhaps the most critical response on the part of the Sudeten leaders to Munich 
and its activities came in the wake of Hitler's putsch within the party in Juli, 1921, 
in which he seized dictatorial power. In a lead article Tag entitled „Which Way?", 
the DNSAP leadership took issue with the entire direction in which Munich was 
going4 1. It contrasted what it termed the „unnatural" way toward National 
Socialism with the „natural". The unnatural way is the striving for instant, visible 
success by any and all means. It has to do with numbers, with superficiality, with 
primitive drives. „This way carries the seeds of its own destruction. It leads by 
3 8
 M a s e r : Frühgeschichte 246; Hitler issued a leaflet in DecemSer, 1921, explaining 
why none of his people attending the DSP congress in Magdeburg. He contrasts his 
„fest und straff organisierte" NSDAP with the DSP and criticizes the trend toward 
casual amalgamation in the völkisch movement. I b i d e m 173. 
3 9
 H a s s e l b a c h , Ulrich von: Die Entstehung der National-Sozialistischen Deutschen 
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way of intoxicating heights into an abyss, and carries the good elements along 
with it." The other way, the natural way, seeks a gradual fruition over time, 
seeks with responsible behavior the attainable with a clear awareness of the givens. 
The article goes on to warn about demagoguery, citing the Social Democrats as 
examples: „The working people don't want falše gods any more", rather, they 
want men „the courage of whose convictions does not find its impetus in a hordě 
of bought and paid for roughnecks . . . It is the duty of us National Socialists to 
stick responsibly with the natural way and keep out of our movement, and dislodge 
from the saddle, everything uncreative, everything tawdry and everything egoisti-
cal that threatens to snatch rights above the party." 
In private, too, the DNSAP leaders warned about the direction in which Munich 
was going. On October 1,1921, Jung wrote the following to Julius Streicher, whom 
he still hoped to win over: „You can only explain the attitude of the Munich group 
by the fact that they've been hoping to change the course in Germany at one stroke 
from Bavaria. Hitler should know by now that these hopes have dissipated and 
must také steps to slowly build the movement in order at least to marke it a serious 
factor in the political life of the German Reich 4 2 ." 
Jung was right. In the putsch attempt two years later, Hitler tried precisely to 
alter the course of Germany in one stroke. Again, the reaction from Bohemia was 
very critical. A lead article in Tag noted: „Hitler's putsch in Munich was, then, 
an ill-considered-act, a failure to recognize political realities, a serious tactical 
mistake. Perhaps this mistake means the political — perhaps even actual — death 
of Hitler . . . but no idea and no Weltanschauung can be destroyed by a tactical 
mistake. National Socialism will and must live on — independent of individual 
fates, and march on with iron determination 4 3 ." 
Jung, of course, had warned about such folly before. On August 29, just a little 
over two months before the beer hall putsch, he had written the following words 
to his Austrian comrades: „Listen to sound advice: you are much too caught up in 
putschism. Already in the .past, it has Struck me unpleasantly — and unlike you, 
I have had to bear the consequences — how much you proclaim the national revolu­
tion at your rallies. Now don't take it amiss, but it is a fact that announced revolu-
tions never take place. In the last analysis, those kinds of things invariably lead to 
the movement falling under the curse of ridiculousness. And that is more dangerous 
than the animosity of our enemies 4 4 ." 
Whatever their tactical criticisms might have been the Bohemian Nazis certainly 
did not abandon Hitler; they visited him frequently in Landsberg, offered advice, 
and still recognized him as the leader 4 5. That loyalty might seem stränge in light 
of the fiasco for the movement of November 9 — but in fact, make complete sense, 
given the position of the Sudeten branch of the movement. For it was not just the 
4 2
 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung, no. 305. 
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mushroom growth of the Munich branch, or the power of Hitler's will and per­
sonality which made the Bohemians accept Hitler's leadership 4 6. The acceptance 
of Reich leadership was implicit in the movement from the very beginning. The 
Bohemian (and Austrian) Nazis sought leadership from the Reich because their 
großdeutsch tenet made them do so. If a Greater German Reich were ever to come 
into being, there had to be a strong National Socialist movement in Germany, for 
only Germany, not rump Austria or submerged Bohemia could bring about Groß­
deutschland. Hence, from the very beginning, the Bohemians saw their task as 
creating in Germany a branch of the movement which would someday take leader­
ship of the great cause. In a sense, if there had been no Hitler, the Bohemian Nazis 
would have had to create him. Very early on, in August, 1919, the DAP wrote 
that „the national socialist movement in the Reich is our hope. I t will become 
strong, seize leadership unto itself and everything will work out all r ight 4 7 ." A 
year later, the DNSAP leader, Alexander Schilling, noted that: „Without a corre-
sponding sounding aboard in the Reich, in the motherland, our party will always 
be condemned to play the role of lost outpost, cut off from the center 4 8 ." Some 
months later, as the Sudetens were reflecting on the meaning of their recent gather-
ing in Salzburg, their páper observed that for two years now they have been Citizens 
of a statě and have had to learn how ineffectual their words are against Czech 
bayonets. Help could only come from elsewhere. 
„In this way, the National Socialist movement in Germany has become a matter 
of life and death, not only for the party, but for Germandom in Czechoslovakia 
as a whole. If Germany sinks, so will the Germans in this country; if National 
Socialism whose seed we have transplanted to Germany, goes under, then the 
National Socialist party of Czechoslovakia will again sink to the level of a more 
or less sizable party, but which will not have more than local significance 4 9 ." 
So quite consistently, even before Hitler took over the movement in Germany 
and brought it to prominence, the Sudeten Nazis were looking to Germany as the 
ultimate context in which a branch of the movement would develop, to which they 
could eventually pass on the mantle of leadership. But in their efforts to transplant 
and nurture a Reich branch of the movement, they always insisted on their own 
definitions, their own independence, as the pioneers of the movement. They stead 
fastly claimed the status of „senior Nazis", maintained their distance and were 
more critical than anyone in Munich world have dared. In short, they remained 
guardians of the National Socialist idea. And this remained true even after Hitler 
seized control of the party and made it a political factor in Bavaria. 
4 6
 The NSDAP experienced mushroom growth from latě 1922 through much of 1923, 
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In retrospect, to have made sudí a claim seems to be sheer affrontery, even in 
1923. To have continued to make them, as Jung did all the way down to 1933 
seems to be sheer madness. After all, Hitler became, briefly, a key figuře in world 
history in the twentieth Century. Rudolf Jung pales to insignificance next to the 
man who brought National Socialism to power in Germany and then proceeded 
to rock Europe and the world before he and his movement were destroyed in a 
devastating war. And yet, the evidence suggests that Hitler owed a great deal to 
these „forgotten Nazis", in particular during the early days, but later on as well. 
To assert Hitler's indebtedness to the Bohemian Nazis is, in a sense, to tread on 
thin ice, for the evidence for this contention is predominantly circumstantial. For 
one thing, Hitler never acknowledged his debt, for another, most of what the senior 
Nazis wrote later on about the old days is an obvious attempt to curry favor after 
Hitler came to dominate Germany 5 0. Documentary evidence is slim. However, the 
following factors in combination suggested strongly that Hitler owed a great deal 
to the „forgotten" Nazis. 
Hitler did not hesitate to acknowledge debts when it was to his advantage to do 
so. He admitted how much he had learned from the Left about mass agitation — 
but that was by way of ridiculing the left for their failure to fully exploit those 
techniques51. He dedicated the first volume of Mein Kampf to the fallen on 
November 9 — but they were dead and made convenient martyrs for the move­
ment, while obviously representing no threat. Volume two, he dedicated to his old 
mentor, Dietrich Eckhart, but Eckhart had died in prison and likewise offered no 
threat 5 2 . But nowhere does Hitler even so much as mention the Bohemian Nazis 
subsequently; nowhere in Mein Kampf do they appear; nowhere in his rambling 
Table Talk later on, in which he touches upon every other conceivable topič, do 
the Bohemian Nazis receive even passing mention 5 3 . He never mentions them 
precisely because he owes thěm more than he cares to admit. 
Other contemporary testimony does bear out his indebtedness. Konrad Heiden, 
certainly no friend of National Socialism, noted how much the Bohemian Nazis, 
and especially Jung, had contributed to Hitler in the way of ideology, especially 
with respect to asserting links between Bolshevism, Democracy and the Jews 5 4. 
Ernst Lüdecke, one of Hitler's early followers and an active fund raiser for the 
movement, pointed out later the importance of the Bohemian Nazis for National 
Socialism: his introduction to them „enabled me for the first time to look at the 
German Nazi movement with the broader view, from the outside. We were, after 
all, not an isolated phenomenon, but an organic development of an impulse that 
5 0
 A good example is a Denkschrift written by Hans Krebs and dated October 24, 1940, 
in which he asserts that DNSAP people fought for unification under Hitler of the 
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Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung, pp. 312. 
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for years had existed every where among the German people 5 5 ." Significantly, 
Lüdecke's first fund raising trip abroad — to the United States — was undertaken 
through the initiative of the „Interstate Chancellory". His letter of introduction 
was signed by Jung and Riehl 5 6 . Subsequent observers have noted, too, the many 
contributions made by the borderland Nazis to the Hitler movement in the early 
days 5 T. Documentary evidence shows that from very early on, connections bet­
ween the Sudeten Nazis and Munich were extensive, not only through the formal 
mechanism of the „Interstate Chancellory", but also including a far-reaching 
speaker exchange, financial aid and tactical advice 5 8. But the most compelling 
evidence for Hitler's debt to the Sudetens in particular, lies in the fact that after 
Landsberg, his Situation was strikingly similar to what theirs had been all along, 
and that subsequently his tactics dosely paralleled what theirs had been. In an 
inhospitable environment consisting of political stability, economic upturns and 
a hostile statě, both groups had to be radical enough to attract and keep a hard core 
of followers, but not so overtly radical as to overstep the fine line that separated 
official tolerance from crackdown. The Situation demanded, moreover, the ability 
to speak radically and in emotional language, but not specifically enough to draw 
the accusation of treason. It demanded participation in a parliamentary systém, if 
only as a platform to express views hostile to that systém. It demanded learning 
the triek of allying temporarily with conservatives without being identified with or 
coopted by them 5 9. Above all, it demanded a solid ideological foundation to tide 
them over a quiescent period in the wilderness until such time as the prospect of 
power was credible 60. 
The Sudeten Nazis, having to function in Czechoslovakia, were past masters at 
all these things. Moreover, as we have seen, they were never loathe to pass on ad­
vice to Munich, even when conditions there were far different from their own. 
Now that conditions were similar, they could hardly have refrained from pointing 
5 5
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5 6
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this fact out. Indeed, both Jung and Knirsch frequently visited Hitler in Lands-
berg 61. It has been suggested, in fact, that Knirsch was one of those who helped 
pull Hitler out of his despair 62. Part of this attempt might well have been by way 
of sharing experiences and painting a picture of how the movement might go from 
its nadir to build a solid base in Germany. Given Hitler's propensity to learn from 
friend and foe alike, there is reason to assume that he saw the parallel between his 
branch of the movement and theirs, and acted accordingly. 
There is little doubt that the Sudeten Nazis saw things that way and perceived 
themselves as Hitler's schoolmasters. They continued to give advice freely, as they 
always had, and indeed were convinced that the Munich branch of the movement 
was becoming more similar to their own because of their influence. 
This is especially the case with Jung, who corresponded regularly with Gregor 
Strasser and tried to mediate when Gregor's brother, Otto, bolted the NSDAP 
in 1930. Jung's words to Otto, urging him to return to the fold, reflected his image 
of the role played by the Sudeten Nazis vis-a-vis the Reich branch of the move-
ment: „There is no doubt in my mind that the Reich party, as a matter of course, 
is travelling the same path as ours has. We were of this opinion already years ago 
and for that reason did not take all too seriously various remarks. The Reich party 
which at the beginning only wanted to be a movement has been compelled to enter 
parliament. The reason given, that the party needed immunity and gratis [rail-
road] tickets, did not hold water and only represented a rear guard action. For no 
party will get votes for that reason. What is needed instead is sober work within 
the par l iament . . . / ' 
Now you are of the opinion that the Reich party has abandoned socialism and 
is no longer in a position to win over the artisans [Handwerker]. According to my 
experience, one achieves this only when the party is strong enough to protéct them 
and to work in their social and political interest. But that in turn is only possible 
when [the party] enters the Reichstag in greater numbers. Then it would be com-
pelled . . . to take Stands on the issues of the day soberly and objectively in the 
various committees and plenary sessions. That is the way we do it. Nor does one 
need to atrophy, as our example demonstrates. We achieve the necessary balance 
through large rallies, for example the ,völkischen Tag', and are simultaneously 
party and movement63." 
Jung's assessment of Hitler's party was, of course, wrong. It represented the 
same kind of whistling in the dark that the DNSAP leaders had indulged in for 
years. Certainly Hitler owed them a great deal. After all, the „legal" NSDAP of 
1930 was a far cry from the putsch-oriented one of 1923, and the Sudeten Nazis 
had a lot to do with the difference. But the Führer was not about to acknowledge 
that debt, nor were any similarities between his political tactics and those pursued 
by the DNSAP for years anything more than temporary expedients. Contrary to 
Jung's assertion, the NSDAP was not in the process of becoming like the DNSAP. 
61
 See e. g., Tag, no. 98, May 21, 1924. 
62
 See S c h l a b r e n d o r f , Fabian von: The Secret War Against Hitler. New York 
1965, p. 183. 
63
 Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung 313, Letter of July 17, 1930. 
153 
Had Jung and his colleagues been less provincial and more perceptive they might 
have noted this fact. They might have perceived that to any outside observer the 
Sudeten Nazis had objectively lost their „seniority" in the movement as early as 
1923 when Hitler first rose dramatically to prominence in Germany and made 
„junior partners" of them. Nowhere is this reversal of roles in the changing rela-
tionship between the Sudeten Nazis and Hitler so dramatically apparent than 
within the framework of the so-called „Interstate Chancellory". This liaison 
Organisation was the brainchild of Walter Riehl, leader of the Austrian branch of 
the movement. At a meeting of 150 delegates from both the Austrian and Sudeten 
branches in Vienna in early December, 1919, Riehl noted that although it might be 
a bit premature, since there was not yet a strong brother movement in the Reich, 
there were sufficient „intellectual roots" of National Socialism to justify some 
kind of Organization to link the various groups. The other delegates agreed and 
assigned the Austrians the task of setting it up. Part of its activities was to be an 
annual Conference to be held, usually in August, where National Socialists from 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland would get together to coordinate 
their activities and render mutual support64. There were three of these meetings — 
at Salzburg in 1920, Linz in 1921, Vienna in 1922. Each of them showed drama-
tically an evolutionary process in which the power and prestige of the Munich 
branch increased and that of the original Nazis diminished accordingly. 
The first Conference met on August 8, 1920 in Salzburg65. Two hundred and 
fifty representatives showed up along with one hundred guests. All the groups were 
there, including Brunner's Deutschsozialisten, the Upper Silesians, represented by 
Alexander Schilling, the Sudetens by Jung, Knirsch and others. The Munich group 
sent Drexler and Hitler. The hosts, of course, were the Austrians. The allocation 
of votes reflects which group was predominant: it was the Bohemians 66. They 
had four votes, the Austrians three, Brunner's people two, the others one each. 
That meant that theoretically the Sudetens and Austrians together had seven times 
the weight that the Munich delegation had. That superiority showed up in the deci-
sions. The Conference declared that all the groups together would now be called the 
„National Socialist Party of the German People", something that Hitler would 
always reject, insisting on the exclusivity of his branch of the movement and of 
his personal leadership. At this point, however, he was in no position to insist on 
anything. He did not yet completely dominate even the Munich branch of the move-
ment, much less all the others; moreover, he was not even known yet to the others. 
The records of this Conference show only that a comrade „Hüttler" made a brief 
speech indicating that he would rather „be hung in a Bolshevik Germany than be 
contented in a French Germany", and then went on to describe the growth of the 
party in Munich. He also forcefully pointed out that it was absolutely necessary 
to translate ideological awareness into an active mass movement. It is doubtful if 
this harbinger of the future sank in, for the Conference proceeded with the usual 
64
 Tag, no. 210, December 14, 1919. 
65
 For the proceedings, see Tag, no. 166, August 13, 1920 and no. 167, August 4, 1920. 
66
 The votes were allocated already several months before the Conference. Tag, no. 136, 
June 22, 1920. 
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duli Speeches and stale ideological debates. Hitler had, however, apparently im-
pressed one of those present. After he finished speaking, Jung purportedly said in 
an aside to his secretary: „This Hitler will someday be our greatest6 7." 
The next Conference met in Linz on August 13 and 14, 1921 6 8 . Again the votes 
were weighted as the previous year, the Bohemians with four, the Austrians with 
three, the Munich branch now had two votes, one more than the previous year. But 
that scarcely mattered, for no one was there officially from Munich. Just one month 
before, Hitler had staged his paláce revolution and seized dictatorial control of 
the Munich party. As a result, the Munich Nazis boycotted the Conference which 
still spoke for a National Socialism which Hitler rejected. As the Conference un-
folded, it became apparent that the „senior" Nazis were living in a fool's para-
dise. It was the same old dreary business. Greetings and reports; more resolutions 
trying to define the party's ideological position, sessions on currency reform, a 
lecture by Riehl on profit sharing as a road to socialism, and finally a lengthy 
debatě over whether the party should follow the economic ideas of Gottfried Feder 
or Sylvio Gesell. The Conference concluded with a steamboat ride and a hike. The 
only steps taken which showed any realization at all of the coming power rela-
tionships was the decision to move the „Interstate Chancellory" to Germany. But 
even then, where it was to be located was to be decided democratically. 
On June 15, 1922, the third and final gathering of the „Interstate Chancel­
lory" took place in Vienna 6 9. But reflecting the reversal in roles from four years 
before, this was not so much a Conference as a „Führerbesprechung". From Munich 
in great numbers came the Hitler people, including Esser, Drexler, Amann, Rosen-
berg, Singer, and, of course, the Führer himself. This time there was no thought of 
weighted votes or lengthy ideological debates. Rather, the dominant feature of the 
meeting was a display of the way the Munich people played politics: a rally in the 
Sophiensale complete with the new Ordnertruppe to keep order and several hun­
dred Communist hecklers who nearly turned the rally into a Munich-style brawl. 
Significantly, when the noise abated, Riehl introduced Hitler as „unseren Reichs­
deutschen Führer". 
From this point on, there was no question as to who the junior partners were in 
National Socialism despite their chronological seniority: the Bohemian (and Au­
strian) Nazis. Stuck in the backwater of central Europe, they were forced more and 
more to recognize Hitler's waxing stár in the Reich, and the notoriety which his 
brand of politics brought. Six months after the Vienna meeting, the Austrian Natio­
nal Socialist, Riehl, wrote: „Today an American friend sent me a copy of a large 
American newspaper, in which no less than one and a half columns are devoted to 
you and the Bavarian movement, which were scarcely known a year ago 7 0 . " It 
was indicative of how far the Munich branch had come in a short time; a similar 
article on the Sudeten or Austrian Nazis was scarcely to be expected. 
6 7
 See H e i d e n : Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 33—35. — M a s e r : Frühgeschichte 
244—246. 
6 8
 For the proceedings, see Tag, no. 118, August 3, 1921 (on preparations for the Con­
ference) and no. 128, August 23, 1921. — M a s e r : Frühgeschichte 281—282. 
6 9
 Again, see Tag, no. 93, June 20, 1922 for the proceedings. — B r a n d s t ö t t e r : 
Riehl 185—187. 
7 0
 M a s e r : Frühgeschichte 342. 
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